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THE MINOR PARTIES
Glenn Kefford
The 2019 federal election is noteworthy for many reasons. One of 
the defining stories should be that the ALP and the Liberal–National 
Coalition have been unable to draw voters back from the minor parties 
and Independents. Put simply, the long-term trend is away from the 
major parties. In this election, there was a small nationwide increase in the 
vote for minor parties and Independents in the House of Representatives, 
while in the Senate there was a modest decline. The State-level results are 
more varied. The Coalition lost ground in some places and maintained 
its vote in others. The ALP vote, in contrast, was demolished in Tasmania 
and in Queensland. Almost one in three Queenslanders and Tasmanians 
decided to support a party or candidate in the House other than the ALP 
or the Coalition. Across the entire country, this was around one in four 
(see Figure 17.1). In the Senate, Queensland and Tasmania again had 
the largest non–major party vote. These results are dissected in greater 
detail in other chapters in this volume, but they suggest that supply-side 
opportunities remain for parties and candidates expressing anti–major 
party sentiments. Put simply, the political environment remains fertile 
for minor party insurgents. 
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Figure 17.1 First‑preference votes for minor parties and Independents
Source: Compiled with data kindly provided by Antony Green and from Australian 
Electoral Commission (2016 and 2019) .
In terms of seat composition, the minor parties have remained unchanged 
in the House, with Katter’s Australian Party (KAP), the Australian Greens 
(discussed in Chapter 16, this volume) and Centre Alliance (formerly the 
NXT) holding on to their respective seats. However, it is in the Senate 
where things have changed dramatically.1 The government is presented 
with a streamlined Senate crossbench compared with what it faced after 
the 2016 election. In total, the Senate crossbench will consist of 15 
representatives from the minor parties: nine Greens, two from the Centre 
Alliance, two from Pauline Hanson’s One Nation (PHON), one from 
the Australian Conservatives and one from the Jacqui Lambie Network 
(JLN). In contrast, after the 2016 election, the crossbench was 20-strong. 
Beyond the results, and a discussion of how important minor party 
preference flows were to the outcome (see Raue, Chapter 9, this volume), 
there were two critical stories about the minor parties that emerged 
from the 2019 election that will be the focus of this chapter. First, while 
there has been much discussion of the way the major parties and the 
Greens have used social media for the past decade or more (Gibson and 
McAllister  2011), this is the first election in which there has been 
a significant expansion in social media usage by the other minor parties. 
1  The number and type of minor parties in the Senate are further complicated by the Section 
44 disqualifications; some senators who were elected as a result of disqualifications subsequently 
switched parties or created their own (discussed in Chapter 3, this volume). 
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At a time when the traditional media landscape is fragmenting, this allows 
these parties to bypass the talking heads and deliver their messages directly 
to voters. Second, the re-emergence of Clive Palmer on the national 
political scene is an important part of the story—most of all for what it 
says about power and influence in Australian politics. Palmer reportedly 
spent over $60 million and, while he failed to win a seat and ended up 
with a meagre share of first preferences, at the very least, he contributed to 
the framing of the election in the minds of voters. These issues are worthy 
of further examination and are unpacked below. 
The minor parties embrace digital
For a decade or more, there has been increased interest in how various 
political actors are embracing the digital age (Chen 2013, 2015). Many 
analyses have suggested that the use of digital media by the non-Greens 
minor parties has been at a basic level, with rudimentary candidate pages 
that were lacking in how they engaged their audience (Chen 2012; 
Kefford 2018). The 2019 contest was different. What this election showed 
is that the minor parties are, albeit slowly, increasing the sophistication 
and scale of their social media and digital campaigns.2 When the social 
media and digital advertising of the KAP, JLN, PHON, United Australia 
Party (UAP), Centre Alliance, the Australian Conservatives and Fraser 
Anning’s Conservative National Party (CNP) are analysed, we see evidence 
of significant investment in the digital space. 
Unsurprisingly, Facebook remains the dominant mode for minor parties 
to interact with voters and the minor parties appear to have been well served 
by their social media accounts before and during the election campaign. 
As Esposito (2019) demonstrated, the Facebook pages for Fraser Anning 
(CNP), Pauline Hanson (PHON) and Malcolm Roberts (PHON) 
featured ‘in the top five performers for the year when it comes to total 
interactions on the platform’.3 The reach of and voter engagement with 
the social media accounts of key minor party actors were also significant 
during the campaign. As Table 17.1 demonstrates, engagement with the 
2  For a larger discussion of social media use, see Bruns and Moon (2018). McSwiney (2019) also 
noted that right-wing minor parties in 2019 were primarily using social media for issue framing.
3  Palmer (discussed more in the section below) had an unusual digital journey after the previous 
election. His online presence after the 2016 election started to resemble and be influenced by the alt-
right (Caccamo 2018), but, as the election drew closer, these influences seemed to diminish and he 
ran an orthodox digital campaign with social media at the centre.
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social media accounts of key minor parties during the official campaign 
period (11 April–18 May) was comparable with that of the major parties.4 
Pauline Hanson’s Facebook page had the most interactions, and this is 
perhaps unsurprising given it has one of the highest number of followers 
of any of Australia’s political pages. With seven of these posts receiving 
over 10,000 interactions, and with more than 250,000 followers on the 
platform, it is likely that each of these posts was viewed by hundreds 
of thousands of voters. In total, Hanson had 11 of the top 20 posts by 
engagement numbers and all of the top seven. The UAP, JLN and Anning’s 
pages had the remaining posts in the top 20. 
Table 17.1 Top 20 minor party campaign posts on Facebook by number 
of interactions
Date Interactions Party/candidate and link Content
6 May 30,209 PHoN: www .facebook .
com/PaulineHansonAu/
posts/990539244483721
Anti‑ALP
30 April 24,936 PHoN: www .facebook .
com/PaulineHansonAu/
posts/986838414853804
Internal PHoN problems 
and response
1 May 23,705 PHoN: www .facebook .
com/PaulineHansonAu/
posts/987248828146096
Internal PHoN problems 
and response
17 April 22,353 PHoN: www .facebook .
com/PaulineHansonAu/
posts/979164695621176
Anti‑Turnbull 
8 May 17,587 PHoN: www .facebook .
com/PaulineHansonAu/
posts/991268844410761
Hanson visiting supporter
29 April 17381 PHoN: www .facebook .
com/PaulineHansonAu/
posts/985985544939091
Policy: $15–20 billion on 
dam‑building in north 
Queensland
16 May 14,360 PHoN: www .facebook .
com/PaulineHansonAu/
posts/996513533886292
Attack on mainstream 
media 
4  These data come from Crowdtangle’s Google Chrome plugin, which provides data on the 
social media engagement of various pages. Interactions here are the combined number of reactions, 
comments and shares of the post. As a point of comparison, the most interactions a post from the 
main ALP page received during the campaign was around 35,000 and the main Liberal Party page 
was approximately 37,000. These figures are current for 31 May 2019. 
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Date Interactions Party/candidate and link Content
14 April 13,798 JLN: www.facebook.com/
jacquilambienetwork/
posts/1122791707928356 
[page discontinued]
Lambie joke and photos 
12 May 11,581 Anning: www .facebook .
com/senatorfraseranning/
posts/707083586374005
Racism/visas for white 
South African farmers
14 May 10,676 UAP: www.facebook.com/
CliveFrederickPalmer/
posts/2441739792512210
Anti-Labor/Greens
14 April 10,587 JLN: www.facebook.com/
jacquilambienetwork/
posts/1122756534598540
Anti–major party
9 May 9,670 Anning: www .facebook .
com/senatorfraseranning/
posts/705012946581069
Racism/ban on Muslim 
immigration
13 May 9,509 UAP: www.facebook.com/
CliveFrederickPalmer/
posts/2440482705971252
Anti‑Labor, claim of deals 
with China
28 April 9,149 Anning: www .facebook .
com/senatorfraseranning/
posts/699190917163272
Racism/support for white 
South Africans
16 May 9,002 Anning: www .facebook .
com/senatorfraseranning/
posts/709512019464495
Anti–major party, anti–
mainstream media
30 April 8,688 PHoN: www .facebook .
com/PaulineHansonAu/
posts/986642288206750
Internal PHoN problems 
and response
17 April 8,659 Anning: www .facebook .
com/senatorfraseranning/
posts/692901687792195
Racism/claim that ‘fake 
refugees’ are entering 
country 
2 May 8,114 PHoN: www .facebook .
com/PaulineHansonAu/
posts/987836294754016
Anti-ALP/Shorten
10 May 8,093 PHoN: www .facebook .
com/PaulineHansonAu/
posts/992611410943171
Anti–major parties
7 May 6,931 PHoN: www .facebook .
com/PaulineHansonAu/
posts/991111161093196
Results in NSW election
Note: The Facebook pages of Hanson, Lambie, UAP, Palmer, Anning, the Australian 
Conservatives, Brian Burston, KAP and the Centre Alliance were all analysed as part of this 
analysis of social media engagement .
Source: Crowdtangle (see Footnote 6) . 
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In terms of targeting, there is evidence to suggest that the minor parties 
have started to embrace targeting across various platforms and search 
engines. On Facebook, evidence of the UAP and PHON using targeted 
ads during the campaign was identified via the Facebook ad library, as well 
as through searches of some of the party pages and examination of the ads 
they were running. Some of the targeting was, however, more than a little 
unusual. For example, one PHON Senate candidate for New South 
Wales had targeted ‘people over the age of 18 who lived in Victoria’, while 
another targeted ad on Facebook, from the UAP, targeted ‘people aged 
16 to 38 who live in Australia’.5 There were also a number of reports of 
UAP advertising spreading across other areas of digital media, including 
YouTube and mobile game apps, as well as in Google search results 
(Bogle 2019; Vitorovich 2019). This is all evidence of the trajectory of 
minor party campaigning, which is increasingly heading online. 
The increased use of social media by the minor parties to connect with 
voters during the election campaign is unsurprising, but it does present 
challenges. This is changing the nature of electoral politics and how issues 
are framed in the minds of voters. Given that increasing numbers of 
voters are accessing their political information solely from social media, 
Facebook and other platforms provide opportunities for minor parties to 
reach vast numbers of voters in an affordable way. The danger, however, 
is that parties willing to produce misinformation or provocative content 
seem to do better on the platform and, as a result of the network effects 
of social media, this information can spread rapidly across the political 
landscape. This problem is likely to only get worse. 
The return of Clive
Clive Palmer’s return to the federal political arena was significant, not 
because he won a swag of Senate seats and a seat in the House—as he did 
in 2013 with his Palmer United Party (PUP) (Kefford and McDonnell 
2016, 2018)—but because of what his 2019 campaign says about power 
in Australia. An extremely wealthy individual, Palmer has a résumé 
that, among many other things, includes the rapid disintegration of his 
previous party as a result of incompetence and infighting, not paying the 
5  These descriptions are taken from Facebook’s advertising information, which provides limited 
details on the targeting strategy used.
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workers of his Queensland Nickel refinery an estimated $7 million in lost 
wages and benefits (Ferrier 2019) and being an absentee parliamentarian 
when he was the member for Fairfax between 2013 and 2016 
(Evershed 2014). He spent a reported $60 million6 on a campaign that 
contributed to how the election was framed in the minds of at least some 
voters and delivered significant preferences to the government, hurting 
the ALP along the way.7
Given the UAP’s eventual nationwide vote was 3.4 per cent in the House 
and 2.3 per cent in the Senate, voters might be wondering what exactly 
the point of all this was. Perhaps we will never know. But Palmer’s return 
to  the federal political arena raises a variety of questions about our 
democracy, including how we want elections to be funded, whether we 
think wealthy individuals should be able to pour this amount of money 
in and whether we care if the messaging from our parties and candidates 
for office is completely detached from anything resembling truth or facts. 
Ultimately, Palmer has burnt through another set of candidates  and 
$60  million dollars with an amateurish, self-interested campaign, 
and maybe he does not care, but perhaps we should. 
The campaign the UAP ran received significant media coverage from 
the outset. First, in April and May 2018, billboards started to emerge 
across the country with Palmer’s image and the slogan ‘Make Australia 
great’. Then, in January 2019, Palmer began advertising through the mass 
media. Television advertisements—which were accused of infringing the 
copyright of a song from the band Twisted Sister—generated plenty of 
media attention for Palmer and were ‘broadcast on the Seven, Nine and 
Ten networks between 50 and 167 times in the first week of January 
alone’ (Whitbourn 2019).8 Around this time, hundreds of thousands of 
text messages were sent out from the UAP claiming that, ‘when elected, 
United Australia Party will ban unsolicited text messages which Labor & 
Liberal have allowed’. The text message also contained a link to the UAP’s 
6  See Chapter 3 (this volume) for more on the advertising spend.
7  It should be noted, however, that in no seat in the House did this change the outcome, so 
the UAP’s preferences had no direct effect on who won government. But as Raue (Chapter 9, this 
volume) demonstrates, around 65 per cent of UAP preferences flowed to the Coalition. 
8  One version of the ad focused on the National Broadband Network, stating that $55 billion 
had been spent on it and it still did not work (Swanston 2019). Another started off with an image of 
disgraced former Labor Senator Sam Dastyari, with the headline: ‘Labor Senator’s expenses paid by 
the Chinese Government.’ This was followed by ‘No more foreign control’ (Whitbourn 2019). 
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website. Again, this generated substantial media coverage for the party. 
But what modest gains the party may have made via increasing its name 
recognition were surely undone by the ill will generated by the tactic. 
Plate 17.1 Copy of UAP text message sent to voters
Source: Brent Davidson, Twitter account, 16 January 2019 .
The contrast with PUP’s 2013 campaign was stark. In 2013, when Palmer 
and his PUP tasted success, they had a set of policies that were generous 
to everyone and were designed to harvest a protest vote (Kefford and 
McDonnell 2016), but their messaging was largely an attack on both 
major parties with their slogan ‘Not the Liberal way or the Labor way, 
but the right way’ being emblematic of this (Kefford and McDonnell 
2016). In 2019, with at least double the amount of funds injected into the 
campaign, Palmer and the UAP released, word for word, the same national 
policies as 2013, with one change: there was no need to ‘dump the 
carbon tax’ as that had already been achieved (UAP 2019h).9 Moreover, 
as opposed to 2013, when the campaign messaging was filled largely with 
generic, anti–major party rhetoric, in 2019, the messaging from the UAP 
was completely detached from reality, primarily targeted the ALP and was 
filled with what can only be described as lies.10 
One media release and message spread across social media was titled: 
‘Labor and China’s Communist government conspiring against Australia’ 
(UAP 2019e). Another said: ‘Bill Shorten will hit us with another trillion 
9  To describe the policies of PUP and the UAP as lacking in detail would be a very generous 
assessment. Instead, they published four policies on their website and then a range of policies were 
floated at points throughout the election campaign. An example of this was a post that said the party 
would ‘increase the age pension by $150 per week’ (UAP 2019g). Another was that they would reduce 
power costs by 50 per cent, once elected (UAP 2019b). 
10  To be clear, there were numerous videos, posts and media releases that attacked the major parties 
together, but there was no advertising that attacked the LNP or Morrison in the way that some of the 
UAP’s advertising did the ALP. 
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dollars of taxes and costs’ (UAP 2019c). A third claimed that Labor’s 
negative gearing policy would allow ‘foreign companies to claim tax 
deductions that Australians will not be able to’ (UAP 2019a). Beyond 
the anti-Labor messaging, Palmer’s economic nationalism was exemplified 
by ads that asked: ‘Did you know that a Chinese communist controlled 
company owns an airport in the Pilbara? Now another Chinese owned 
company has bought another airport near Perth for just $1’ (UAP 2019d). 
This video has, thus far, been viewed 1.4 million times on Facebook. 
Another of the UAP’s fabrications was that the major parties would not 
deliver a tax cut until 2024 (UAP 2019f ); this was spread across social 
media widely and promoted via paid advertising. Over and over, the 
messaging from Palmer and the UAP was not just loose with the truth, 
it had absolutely no connection with it. 
This is all evidence of Palmer’s malignant influence in Australian politics. 
While it could be argued that in 2013 he sought to damage the major 
parties and have his business interests advanced, his campaign resonated 
because of increasing dissatisfaction with the major parties and Australian 
democracy. He was subsequently able to have some input on policy as 
a result of the numbers he held in a finely balanced Senate. The 2019 
campaign was something altogether different. Palmer and his UAP 
actively spread misinformation and falsehoods across the political 
landscape, which may sow further seeds of discontent in the Australian 
body politic.11 Internationally, Palmer’s gigantic personal investment 
and complete domination of his party are not unparalleled (Kefford and 
McDonnell 2018), but it is worth considering whether any plutocrat has 
spent this much money and ended up with as little in return. Perhaps we 
are fortunate that this is the case. 
Conclusion
The 2019 federal election has provided more evidence of the challenges 
Australian democracy confronts. It is becoming increasingly difficult for 
the major parties to build a coalition of voters large enough for them 
to govern across a country where the interests and preferences of the 
States and regions are increasingly contradictory. So, while the crossbench 
11  The scholarship on negative advertising and attack ads has long suggested that negative 
advertising can weaken political efficacy. See Ansolabehere et al. (1994). 
MoRRISoN'S MIRACLE
352
in the Senate has shrunk, the nationwide vote for minor parties and 
Independents in the Senate has decreased slightly and there are certainly 
challenges for each of the minor parties, the reality is that voters are not 
returning to the major parties in any significant way. Voters continue to 
spray their first preferences across a wide range of minor parties, depending 
on the State or Territory in which they live and whether they live in the 
major metropolitan areas or in the regions. There is an opportunity for 
a fourth force to emerge in Australian federal politics, especially on the 
right, but thus far none of the party entrepreneurs has had the resources 
or knowhow to pull this off. 
The challenges of institutionalising, outlined in the 2016 election book 
(Kefford 2018), remain for the minor parties. Indeed, we have seen some 
of these challenges come to fruition. Since the previous election, Nick 
Xenophon departed the parliament, the NXT became the Centre Alliance 
and, notwithstanding Rebekha Sharkie holding on to the seat of Mayo, 
their vote in the Senate has collapsed. While Katter remains very popular 
in his stronghold of Kennedy, his party has made little headway at the 
federal level beyond this seat. Katter, who has held the seat for 26 years, 
is 74 years old and the question must be asked, how much longer can 
he continue? The JLN and PHON probably have reason to be most 
optimistic. Lambie has been returned to the Senate for six years and, given 
the state of play in Tasmania, there is a significant opportunity for her 
to be a long-term senator for the State. PHON has overcome crisis after 
crisis and still managed to increase its Senate vote in Queensland. With 
two senators, the party is, again, in a critical position given the finely 
balanced numbers in that chamber, but whether the party can remain 
united given all the evidence to the contrary remains to be seen. 
Australia’s minor parties remain critical in many ways. They are 
vehicles through which frustration at the major parties and the political 
establishment is channelled. They represent interests that the major 
parties are perceived to overlook. They often determine what policy passes 
through the Senate, securing deals along the way for their home States or 
favoured issues. While there is significant fragmentation on the right—
far more than on the left—and these parties appear to be fighting for 
the same electoral space, the situation is more complex. These parties are 
pulling voters away, not just from the Coalition, but also from the ALP, 
suggesting the drivers of de-alignment are multidimensional. The major 
parties are therefore caught in a bind. They are losing their share of first 
preferences to minor parties, hence, their need to compete with them. But 
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they also require preferences from these parties—thus, they often need 
to find ways to cooperate. Australia’s institutional architecture, therefore, 
continues to produce pressure points that challenge the major parties and 
provide opportunities for the minor parties. 
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